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INTRODUCTION 
The safe-life and damage-tolerant design approaches presented herein 
apply to both metallic and fibrous composite helicopter structures. 
However, to maintain the theme of this workshop, this presentation will 
emphasize the application of these design approaches to fibrous compos- 
ite structures. 
In the current generation of Army helicopters, such as the UH-60 
Black Hawk shown in Figure 1, composite materials make up as high as 17 
percent of the airframe and rotor weight. With the advent of major 
helicopter composite structures R&D projects, such as the Advanced 
Composite Airframe Program (ACAP), and Manufacturing Methods and Tech- 
nology (MM&T) projects, such as UH-60 Low Cost Composite Blade Program, 
it is estimated that within a few years composite materials could be 
applied to as much as 80% of the airframe and rotor weight of a heli- 
copter in a production program. Along with this application is the 
essential requirement that sound, definitive design criteria be developed 
in order that the composite structures possess high fatigue lives for 
economy of ownership and good damage tolerance for flight safety. 
Safe-life and damage-tolerant criteria are applied to all helicopter 
flight critical components, which are generally categorized as follows: 
- Dynamic components - main and tail rotor system, which includes 
blades, hub and rotating controls, and drive train which includes trans- 
mission, and main and interconnecting rotor shafts. 
- Airframe - fuselage, aerodynamic surfaces and landing gear. 
Figure 1 
TYPICAL STRESS SP%CTRA FO'R A HELICOPTER BLAbF 
ROOT END, AND TRANSPORT' AIRPLANE' ROOT END 
The dynamic components previously described tend to be fatigue 
critical. Although fatigue problems have been known to occur within 
the helicopter airframe, it for the most part is designed by strength 
and minimum gage. 
Figure 2 shows a typical comparison of the stress history for a trans- 
port helicopter blade root end and that for a.typical commercial trans- 
port wing root. The helicopter dynamic components tend to be loaded at 
frequencies that are a multiple of rotor speed - typically 2 to 20 Hz. 
This loading rate represents 7 million to 70 million cycles per 1000 
operating hours. Thus these components experience a much higher fre- 
quency of cyclic loading but with a narrower spread of the loading than 
the fixed wing aircraft component. 
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SAFE. LI:FE .P:HI.LOS#PH~Y. 
The safe-life design approach is stated in Figure 3. It applies to 
statistically predictable failures which are those occurring from the 
random combination of fatigue strength and applied fatigue loads. 
ALL FATIGUE CRITICAL COMPONENTS OF
THE HELICOPTER A E DESIGNED TO A 
SPECIFIC SERVICE LIFE, IN OPERATIONAL 
HOURS, AND ARE REMOVED FROM SERVICE 
AT OR BEFORE THIS ELAPSED TWE SO 
THAT THE PROBABILITY OF A FATIGUE 
FAILURE IS REMOTE 
Figure 3 
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SAFE-LIFE METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for the fatigue design of primary structural com- 
ponents is schematically outlined in Figure 4. The three basic elements 
of safe-life design include: 
- Working Fatigue S-N Curve- developed based upon coupon tests to 
determine curve shapes, full-scale specimen tests to provide data points 
for constructing a mean curve, and then a statistical reduction of the 
mean curve to a "working" curve upon which the damage.calculations are 
based. A minimum of six,full-scale test specimens are generally 
required to establish the mean curve. The statistical reduction is made 
on the stress (and not cycles) for it is the high cycles region of the 
S-N curve at which fatigue loading occurs. 
- Design Loading Spectra - developed from the mission profile 
which is a prediction of how the aircraft shall be used, and the flight 
loads which are developed for the various maneuvers and flight condi- 
tions of the helicopter's mission profile. Obviously in the development 
of a new helicopter s,ystem, these loads must initially be either pre- 
dicted or empirically derived from measured loads on similar helicopters. 
- Cumulative Damage Theory - the combination of loads and fatigue 
strength by means of a cumulative damage theory results in the component 
fatigue life. 
The safe-life methodology outlined herein typifies that used by most 
US and European helicopter manufacturers (references 1 through 3) 
although specific approaches for analysis of the loads and the material 
fatigue data vary with the manufacturers. 
For the UH-60 Black Hawk and the YAH-64 Apache, the Army's more 
recent helicopter development programs, the minimum required fatigue 
life for all dynamic components has been 5,000 and 4,500 flight hours, 
respectively. Many of the components on these aircraft have exceeded 
their minimum fatigue life requirement. 
Figure 4 
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-FAILURE :RATE VS FId.GHT HOURS 
The safe-life design approach, when properly executed, places 
statistically predictable failures at an extremely remote probability 
of occurrence. This approach does, however, assume the structure to ' 
be flaw free. Over the years operational experience has shown (refer- 
ences 4 through 6) that the safe-life approach by itself is not adequate 
because of unpredictable failures resulting from such sources as manu- 
facturing defects and service-induced damage (see Figure 5). Further- 
more, review of this operational experience has shown these unpredictable 
failures to far outnumber the predictable ones. 
RETIREMENT 
E 
LIFE 
2 Unexpected Causes 
E 
(Defects, Damage, etc.) 
7 Statistically 
Figure 5 
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DAMAGE SOURCES 
The statistically nonpredictable failures discussed in the previous 
figure result from one of three categories of damage - initial, as 
originating from material defects or manufacturing-induced anomalies, 
service-induced or ballistic. Examples for each of the damages are 
presented in Figure 6. Ballistic damage is certainly an in-service 
occurrence; however, because of the extreme nature of this damage and 
its associated short residual life requirement (30 minutes to roughly 
5 hours), is generally addressed separately from the other damage types, 
and shall not be discussed herein. 
. DESIGN ERRORS 
. MATERIAL-AND MANUFACTURING-INDUCED DEFECTS 
- IMPROPER LAYUP 
- INCORRECT/INCOMPLETE CURING 
- MACHINING ERRORS 
- HANDLING/ASSEMBLING AREAS 
. SERVICE INDUCED DAMAGE 
- FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGE [FllDI 
- MAINTENANCE ERRORS 
- GROUNO HANDLING 
. BALLISTIC DAMAGE 
- SMALL ARMS PROJECTILES 17.62mm & 12.7mml 
- HIGH EXPLOSIVE INCINOIARY 123mm HEI-TI 
Figure 6 
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EARLY DAMAGE TOLERANCE REQUIREMENTS 
Although damage tolerance as we know it today is a relatively new 
technology, its importance was recognized as long as four centuries ago. 
Near the end of the fifteenth century, technical notes were written on 
what must have been one of the first requirements for damage-tolerant 
design. They were in the notebook of Leonardo da Vinci in which he 
discussed the physics of flight and the design of "flying machines," and 
are shown in Figure 7 (reference 7). 
In the early 60's a fail-safe design philosophy began to evolve 
within the rotory wing industry and has been used in numerous applica- 
tions for both metallic and fibrous composite structures (references 8 
through 10). The safeguard in the fail-safe approach is that damage, 
induced or fatigue, will be detected by inspection procedures before it 
grows to such an extent that the residual strength of the structure is 
reduced below a safe level. 
In the early 70's a third design philosophy - damage tolerance - 
began to evolve. It is similar'to the fail-safe approach but further 
considers the growth of damage resulting during manufacture or service 
usage. Therefore, fundamental to the damage-tolerant approach is an 
understanding of structural performance in the presence of defects or 
damage. 
“IN CONSTRUCTING WINGS ONE SHOULD MAKE ONE CORD TO BEAR THE 
STRAIN AN0 A LOOSER ONE IN THE SAME POSITION SO THAT IF ONi 
BREAKS UNOER STRAIN THE OTHER IS IN POSITION TO SERVE THE SAME 
FUNCTION: 
fROM LEOIIARDO DA VIMCI’S KOTEBOOK 
OK DESIGN Of “ILVIWG MACHIRES” 
ISlEI CENIURV 
Figure 7 
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DAMAGE TOLERANCE PHILOSOPHY 
Damage tolerance is a safety requirement and equates to the fail- 
safe design approach employed for flight critical components by the 
rotary wing industry since the early 60's. Damage tolerance is the 
ability of the structure to resist failure due to the presence of 
defects, cracks, or other damage for a time period sufficient to enable 
their detection. 
The essential elements of damage tolerance are presented in 
Figure 8. In designing to this philosophy, the criteria must address 
both the static residual strength and damage propagation for the 
structure under consideration. 
The fail-safe and damage tolerance design philosophies each have 
the common objective of providing structural integrity at a reasonable 
level of assurance for all safety-of-flight structures, that is struc- 
ture whose failure could cause direct loss of the aircraft. Reference 
5 points out an important distinction between fail safety and damage 
tolerance. Fail safety as it was defined prior to the evolution of 
damage tolerance is based upon the premise that one cannot be certain 
that cracks (or damage) will not initiate at some time during the air- 
craft life and these cracks must be detected before the strength drops 
below a certain level. Damage tolerance, on the other hand, assumes 
the existence of initial flaws in the structure and the structure is 
designed to retain adequate residual strength until damage is detected 
and corrective actions taken. 
Although the damage-tolerant approach has begun to see a more wide- 
spread usage within the Army, there is still considerable work to 
be accomplished in developing specific requirements and procedures for 
this design approach. 
The basic philosophy of damage tolerant design is 
based upon: 
l THE ACCEPTANCE THAT DAMAGE WILL OCCUR 
l AN ADEQUATE SYSTEM OF INSPECTION SO THE 
DAMAGE MAY BE DETECTED 
l AN ADEQUATE STRENGTH MAINTAINED IN THE 
DAMAGED STRUCTURE 
Figure 8 
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RESIDUAL STRENGTH AND DAMAGE GROWTH 
The damage-tolerant requirement, which is illustrated schematically 
in Figure 9, addresses both the residual strength and the damage 
propagation for the structure under consideration. 
The residual strength is the amount of static strength available at 
any time during the service exposure with damage present. Safety is 
ensured by designing to requirements wherein damage is never allowed to 
grow and reduce the residual static strength of the structure below a 
specified value, such as that corresponding to the maximum load to be 
experienced in service. 
The damage growth curve presents damage size as a function of time. 
The period of time required for damage to grow from a minimum detect- 
able size, such as by in-service inspection, to a critical size is the 
detection period. The critical size generally corresponds to the maxi- 
mum service load residual strength, although. for composites this value 
could be dictated by stiffness loss to a critical value. 
Figure 9 
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DAMAGE TOLERANCE APPROACHES 
Damage tolerance may be achieved in one of two different methods as 
shown in Figure 10. In fail-safe structures, damage tolerance (and 
their safety) is assured by the allowance of partial structural failure, 
the ability to detect this failure prior to total loss of the structure, 
the ability to operate safely with the partial failure prior to ins'pec- 
tion and the maintenance of specified- static strength throughout the 
period. Fail-safe structures are usually comprised of multiple elements 
or load paths such that damage can be safely contained by failing a load 
path or by arresting a rapidly running crack. In safe crack growth 
structures, damage tolerance is achieved by sizing the structure, using 
fracture mechanics or empirical data, such that initial damage will grow 
at a stable, slow rate and not achieve a size large enough to fail the 
structure prior to detection. A special case within this category is 
nonpropagating-defect structures wherein the structure is designed to 
sufficiently low stress levels for virtually no propagation of the 
largest defect that would not be detected during a production inspection 
or that could be incurred in service. 
SAFETY OF FLIGHT STRUCTURES 
Figure 10 
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SAFE-LIFE AND DAMAGE TOLERANCE REQUIREnENTS FOR ARMY HELICOPTERC 
The structural design specification for helicopter MIL-S-8698 
imposes requirements for safe-life fatigue design of flight critical 
structures but not for fail-safe or damage tolerance design (Figure 11). 
In the more recent major helicopter system procurements, the Army has 
required fail safety or damage tolerance for the helicopter primary 
structure. These requirements have been stated in general terms as 
follows: 
"The primary structure shall incorporate materials, stress levels, 
and structural configurations that will minimize the probability of loss 
of the aircraft due to damage of a single structural element (including 
control system or dynamic components), or due to propagation of unde- 
tected flaws, cracks, or other damage. Slow crack growth, crack 
arrestment, alternate load paths and systems, and other available design 
principles shall be used to achieve this capability.---" 
Because of the general nature of these requirements, they were 
successfully applied to both metallic and fibrous composite structures 
(reference 11). It has been left up to the helicopter manufacturer to 
define the specifics such as damage or flaw sizes, inspection intervals, 
etc., subject, of course, to Government approval. 
l ML-S-8698, STRUCTURAL DESIGN REQUIREMENTS, HELICOPTERS 
- SAFE LIFE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 
- NO FAN SAFE/DAMAGE TOLERANCE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 
' SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT SPECIFICATIONS (UH-60, YAH-641 
- FAIL SAFE/DAMAGE TOLERANCE DESIGN REQTS 
- REQUIREMENTS ARE GENERAL 
- TAILORED TO METALLIC STRUCTURES 
Figure 11 
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COMPOSITE llAIN ROTOR BLADES 
The Army's work in composite main rotor blades has spanned well 
over a decade. Composite blades are either in production or at various 
stages of planned implementation for nearly all inventory helicopters. 
Four composite blade designs are shown in Figures 12 through 15,  
and although they were each developed by a different helicopter manu- 
facturer, there is a certain degree of commonality in the fail-safe and 
damage-tolerant structural design approaches. Two blades are in pro- 
duction - the CH-47D blade (Figure 12) manufactured by Boeing Vertol and 
the K-747 blade (Figure 13) manufactured by Kaman Aerospace. The Hughes 
Helicopters AH-64 composite blade (Figure 14) and the Sikorsky UH-60 
composite blade (Figure 15) are currently under manufacturing develop- 
ment in MM&T programs and are planned for future production implementa- 
tion. 
All blades are of damage-tolerant, high fracture toughness mate- 
rials - either fiberglass or Kevlar. The UH-60 blade spar will be 
approximately 50% graphite; this is necessitated by the desire to main- 
tain the same 9$% blade airfoil thickness as the titanium spar blade 
that it is to replace, and at the same time to match flap, torsion, and 
chord stiffnesses. To accomplish this with fiberglass would necessi- 
tate increasing the inboard airfoil thickness to 14.5%. 
Figure 12 
K-747 COMPOSITE BLADE 
sir sir 
48.00 bb.0 
SiA sir 
111.40 124.40 lb4.00 
l7ACH~flllDtlAllFULlSfAN S GLASS 
WOUND AROUND ALUMIIIUM1llll11G 
fllA,lilll WOUllDItVLAt/t~OXV 
TlAlllllGtDGl Nflltl OIlGIll 
Figure 13 
YAH-64 COMPOSITE MAIN ROTOR BLADE 
IllDt ROD1 tllD 
ROfDt DlANlll = 45 1551 
ILAM CIDID = 11 IllClIS 
IWISI i -I DICIIIS 
:LADl AllfOIl = W.Ol/MAtA b4AOOb 
BlA~I WIlG11 = I55 PDYllD5 
Figure 14 
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COMPOSITE MAIN ROTOR BLADES (CONTINUED) 
All blades have a redundant load path root end except for the CH-47D 
blade; its single lug root end configuration was dictated by hub 
interface requirements. Hence fail safety in the root end has generally 
been achieved through redundancy. 
For the constant airfoil section, damage tolerance is achieved with 
the material selection and relatively low design operating strain 
levels, typically 1500 pin./in. to'.1860 uin./in. 
Two of the blade concepts - the K-747 and AH-64 - also contain 
structural redundancy of the spar in the airfoil region through a 
multi-tubular (or cell) concept; this is to a large degree for ballistic 
tolerance. 
In general, the damage tolerance of these blades was developed and 
demonstrated through subcomponent and full-scale testing. Analysis was 
generally by classical techniques, with fail safety or damage tolerance 
assessed by assuming loss of a certain portion of the structure. 
WI-60 COMPOSITE MAIN ROTOR BLADE 
lOlOt DlAltltl = 53'1" 
BLADI CUOlB = 21" 
UAW WtlCHl = 211 LBS 
UAIUIAClUIIIC PROCESS: WIT FllAU111 
WIIIDl1C/C0CU~IIS 
Figure 15 
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COMPOSITE ROTOR BLADE DAMAGE TOLERAKE DEMONSTRATED BY HLH ROOT END TEST 
Some of  t h e  e a r l y  R&D emphasis on composite b lades  c e n t e r e d  on t h e  
r o o t  end, f o r  t h e  succes s  of composite a p p l i c a t i o n s  t o  t h e  r o t o r  b l a d e  
hinged t o  a  l a r g e  degree  on t h e  development of a  r o o t  end t h a t  was 
s t r u c t u r a l l y  e f f i c i e n t ,  f a i l  s a f e ,  and a t  t h e  same t i m e  p roduc ib le .  
Resu l t s  from damage t o l e r a n c e  t e s t i n g  on t h e  r o o t  end of t h e  HLH b l ade  
which was f i b e r g l a s s  c o n s t r u c t i o n  and weighed 780 l b s  a r e  summarized 
i n  F igu re  16. A f t e r  t e s t i n g  t h i s  specimen f o r  490  hours  t o  demonstra te  
s a f e  l i f e ,  t h e  specimen w a s  damaged t o  vary ing  degrees ,  from s e v e r i n g  
one of t h e  f o u r  r o o t  end l u g s  t o  removing a 6" x 12" s e c t i o n ,  and aga in  
t e s t e d  a s  shown i n  t h e  f i g u r e  t o  demonstra te  i t s  f a i l - s a f e  p r o p e r t i e s .  
A t  t h e  c u t o u t  s e c t i o n  t h e  a x i a l ,  f l a p ,  and chord s t i f f n e s s  w e r e  reduced 
by approximately 50 pe rcen t ,  and t o r s i o n  w a s  reduced by 85 p e r c e n t .  
. UNDAMAGED AFTER 
240 HOURSAT 1W%OF DESIGN LOADS 
250 HOURSAT 3 W O F  DESIGN LOADS 
SUCCESSFULLY WITHST.000 100%OF DESIGN LOADS 
40 HOURS WITH LUG CUT 
130 HOURS WITH LUG CUT AND FORWARD UPPER STRAPS SLOTTED (118 IN. SPANWISE BY 6 IN. CHORDWISE) AND THEN 
SUSTAINED LIMIT LOAD WITH NO DAMAGE PROPAGATION 
30 HOURSWITH LUG CUT AND FORWARD UPPER AND LOWER STRAPSCUT 112 IN. SPANWISE BY 6 IN  CHORDWISE1 
Figure  16 
COMPOSITE ROTOR BLADE DAMAGE TOLERANCE 
DEMONSTRATED BY UTTAS ROOT END TEST 
Investigations have shown that initial deterioration of composites 
under repeated loading is manifested in a gradual loss of stiffness 
which is attributable initially to failure or breakdown within the 
resin. This factor, combined with another important feature that this 
loss in stiffness can occur, depending upon the stress level, many 
thousand cycles before static failure, yields the possiblity of inherent 
damage tolerance for many composite structures. 
This detection method of stiffness loss has been demonstrated in 
full-scale fatigue testing of fiberglass rotor blades. Reference 8 
reports that during fail-safe testing of the Boeing Vertol UTTAS rotor 
blade root end, which was fiberglass/epoxy construction, there was a 
noticeable decrease in torsional stiffness after approximately 2 x 1~~ 
cycles at elevated test loads. This testing is summarized in Figure 17. 
Although the blade still retained its full structural integrity, the 
change in stiffness was deemed a failure. The loads were dropped to high- 
speed level-flight values and the equivalent of 30 flight hours was run, 
with no further measured degradation. Test loads were then increased 
to the original high level and testing continued until blade deflec- 
tions exceeded machine capability. Even here there was no structural 
failure. Dynamic analyses, based upon reduc5d stiffness values, showed 
that the vibrational levels would have risen to a level noticeable to 
the pilot, but would still have been within a safe operating range. 
Additionally, regions of surface delamination became visible along with 
the stiffness loss. A key issue that must he addressed with this detec- 
tion procedure is tying the indication, such as increased vibration 
level, to the correct source. 
1.89 LOAD (277% DESIGN TOROUE) TORSION . 
3.0 1 I' 
RATIO: ONE MILLION CYCLESAT 
BEFLECTION TO 100% DESIGN LOAD 
INITIAL DEFLECTION '" 
1.0 
I I I I 
0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 
CYCLES X lo-' 
Figure 17 
UH-6.0 COMPOSITE TAIL ROTOR SPAR 
The UH-60 composite tail rotor spar provides a good example of the 
need for damage tolerance criteria for composites. This component is 
in:production on the UH-60. It is graphite/epoxy and is highly complex 
in configuration, being made up of more than 300 individual detailed 
plies in order to satisfy strength and stiffness distribution require- 
ments. Because of this complexity and the manufacturing process used, 
the rejection rate of this component during early production was quite 
high. Because the effect of manufacturing defects (See Figure 18) had 
not been quantified for this component, the acceptance criteria was 
stringent. 
Three steps were taken to reduce this unacceptably high rejection 
rate: 
1. Alternate layup 
2. Press grade graphite 
3. Inspection and acceptance criteria 
Out of the three corrective steps, implementation of improved 
inspection techniques and an improved acceptance criterion, based upon 
actual testing of specimens with known defects (voids, porosity and 
inclusions), had the most significant impact.in significantly lowering 
the rejection rate. 
QUAL TEST SPEC #3 
Figure 18 
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m-60 COMPOSITE TAIL ROTOR SPAR - ND1 
'typical ultrasonic indications in spars that were fatigue tested 
to determine acceptance criteria are shown in Figure 19. 
SPAR NDI INDICATIONS TESTED 
E 
Figure 19 
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UH-60 COMPOSITE T A I L  ROTOR SPAR FATIGUE TEST 
F a t i g u e  t e s t i n g  of a t a i l  r o t o r  s p a r  i s  shown i n  F i g u r e  20 .  
F i g u r e  2 0  
UH-60 COMPOSITE TAIL ROTOR SPAR FATIGUE TEST RESULTS 
Figure 21 shows that spars with various defects fell within 
the scatter of spars that were void-free; this enabled establishment 
of a new acceptance criteria. 
BLACKHAWK TAIL ROTOR SPAR 
Figure 21 
SUMMARY/CONCLUSIONS 
Helicopter flight-critical structures, although limited primarily 
to rotor blades, have been successfully designed for damage tolerance. 
This has been accomplished through redundancy, use of damage-tolerant 
materials and sizing to JLOW operating stress levels. Design and 
demonstration have been based on laboratory testing. 
The increased application of composites to more complexly loaded 
structures, such as bearingless rotor hubs which inherently will operate 
a$ higher strain levels, further amplifies the need for a sound damage- 
tolerant criterion. Development of the criterion must address those 
items listed in the last bullet of Figure 22. 
o LABORATORY TESTING THE BASIS FOR DESIGN AND DEVELOPflENT OF DAMAGE 
TOLERANT COMPOSITE STRUCTURES 
o DAMAGE TOLERANT CRITERIA FOR COMPOSITES NEEDED, ESPECIALLY IN 
LIGHT OF 
- COMPOSITES APPLICATION TO MORE COMPLEXLY LOADED COMPONENTS 
- INCREASED STRAIN LEVELS 
o DAMAGE TOLERANT CRITERIA DEVELOPMENT MUST INCLUDE 
- PREDICTIVE CAPABILITY 
- DAMAGE SIZE REQUIREMENTS 
- NDT CAPABILITY/DAMAGE DETECTABILITY 
- DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 
- ENVIRONNENTAL EFFECTS 
- TEST/QUAL REQUIREMENTS 
Figure 22 
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